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Saddam está ganando en Irak


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Daniel

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Identificado: 03/10/2003
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Os pego un interesante artículo de Scott Ritter, inspector de armas para la ONU en Irak de 1991 a 1998:



¡enlace erróneo!
Scott Ritter TMSI
Thursday, July 22, 2004


Misunderstanding Iraq

WASHINGTON The battle for Iraq's sovereign future is a battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. As things stand, it appears that victory will go to the side most in tune with the reality of the Iraqi society of today: the leaders of the anti-U.S. resistance.

Iyad Allawi's government was recently installed by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to counter a Baathist nationalism that ceased to exist nearly a decade ago.

In the aftermath of the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's regime shifted toward an amalgam of Islamic fundamentalism, tribalism and nationalism that more accurately reflected the political reality of Iraq.

Thanks to his meticulous planning and foresight, Saddam's lieutenants are now running the Iraqi resistance, including the Islamist groups.

In August 1995, Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan. Fourteen months into the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Kamal's testimony that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed in the summer of 1991 has taken on new relevance, given the fact that to date no WMD have been found.

More important is Kamal's self-described reason for defecting: Saddam's order that all senior Baath Party officials undergo mandatory Koranic studies. For Saddam, this radical shift in strategy was necessary to his survival, given the new realities of post-Gulf War Iraq.

The traditional Baathist ideology, based on Iraq-centric Arab nationalism, was no longer the driving force it had been a decade prior. Creating a new power base required bringing into the fold not only the Shiite majority - which had revolted against him in the spring of 1991 - but also accommodating the growing religious fundamentalism of traditional allies such as key Sunni tribes in western Iraq.

The most visible symbol of Saddam's decision to embrace Islam was his order to add the words "God Is Great" to the Iraqi flag.

The transformation of the political dynamics inside Iraq, however, went largely unnoticed in the West. It certainly seems to have escaped the attention of the Bush administration. And the recent "transfer of sovereignty" to Allawi's government reflects this lack of understanding.

One of the first directives issued by Paul Bremer, the former head of the CPA, was to pass a "de-Baathification" law, effectively blacklisting all former members of that party from meaningful involvement in the day-to-day affairs of post-Saddam Iraq. The law underscored the mindset of those in charge of Iraq: Baathist holdouts loyal to Saddam were the primary threat to the U.S.-led occupation.

Senior Bush administration officials recognized their mistake - though a little too late. In April, 2004, Bremer rescinded his "de-Baathification" order. The Pentagon today speaks of a "marriage of convenience" between Islamic fundamentalists and former members of Saddam's Baathist regime, even speculating that the Islamists are taking over Baathist cells weakened by American anti-insurgency efforts.

Once again, the Pentagon has it wrong. U.S. policy in Iraq is still unable or unwilling to face the reality of the enemy on the ground.

The Iraqi resistance is no emerging "marriage of convenience," but rather a product of years of planning. Rather than being absorbed by a larger Islamist movement, Saddam's former lieutenants are calling the shots in Iraq, having co-opted the Islamic fundamentalists years ago, with or without their knowledge.

One look at the list of the 55 "most wanted" members of the Saddam regime who remain at large reveals the probable chain of command of the Iraqi resistance today. It also underscores the success of Saddam's strategic decision nearly a decade ago to disassociate himself from Baathist ideology.

Keep in mind that there was never a formal surrender ceremony after the U.S. took control of Baghdad. The security services of Saddam's Iraq were never disbanded; they simply melted away into the population, to be called back into service when and where they were needed.

The so-called Islamic resistance is led by none other than former Vice President Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, an ardent Iraqi nationalist, a Sunni Arab and a practicing member of the Sufi brotherhood, a society of Islamic mystics. His deputy is Rafi Tilfah, who headed the Directorate of General Security (DGS), an organization that had thoroughly penetrated Iraqi society with collaborators and informants during Saddam's regime.

As a former UN weapons inspector, I have personally inspected the headquarters of the DGS in Baghdad, as well as the regional DGS headquarters in Tikrit. The rooms were full of files concerning those who were working with or on behalf of the DGS. There is not a person, family, tribe or Islamic movement in Iraq that the DGS does not know intimately - information that is an invaluable asset when coordinating and facilitating a popular-based resistance movement.

I also interacted with the former director of the Special Security Organization, Hani al-Tilfah, on numerous occasions during 1997-98, when he was put in charge of riding roughshod over my inspections. Today he helps coordinate the operations of the Iraqi resistance using the very same officers.

Tahir Habbush headed the Iraqi Intelligence Service that perfected the art of improvising explosive devices and using them to carry out assassinations. In the months prior to the U.S.-led invasion, he was ordered to blend his agents back into the Iraqi population so as to avoid detection by any occupying force.

The recent anti-American attacks in Fallujah and Ramadi were carried out by well-disciplined men fighting in cohesive units, most likely drawn from the ranks of Saddam's Republican Guard.

The level of sophistication should not have come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the role of the former chief of the Republican Guard, Sayf al-Rawi, in secretly demobilizing select Guard units for this very purpose prior to the U.S. invasion.

The transfer of sovereignty to the new Iraqi government of Iyad Allawi is a charade that will play itself out over the next weeks and months, and with tragic consequences. Allawi's government, hand-picked by the United States from the ranks of anti-Saddam expatriates, lacks not only a constituency inside Iraq but also legitimacy in the eyes of many ordinary Iraqi citizens.

The truth is that there never was a significant people-based opposition movement inside Iraq for the Bush administration to call on to form a government to replace Saddam. It is why the United States has instead been forced to rely on the services of individuals tainted by their association with foreign intelligence services, or drawn from opposition parties heavily infiltrated by agents of Saddam's former security services.

Regardless of the number of troops the United States puts on the ground or how long they stay there, Allawi's government is doomed to fail. The more it fails, the more it will have to rely on the United States to prop it up. The more the United States props up Allawi, the more discredited he will become in the eyes of the Iraqi people - all of which creates yet more opportunities for the Iraqi resistance to exploit.

We will suffer a decade-long nightmare that will lead to the deaths of thousands more Americans and tens of thousands of Iraqis. We will witness the creation of a viable and dangerous anti-American movement in Iraq that will one day watch as American troops unilaterally withdraw from Iraq every bit as ignominiously as Israel did from Lebanon.

The calculus is quite simple: the sooner we bring our forces home, the weaker this movement will be. And, of course, the obverse is true: the longer we stay, the stronger and more enduring this byproduct of Bush's elective war on Iraq will be.

There is no elegant solution to our Iraqi debacle. It is no longer a question of winning but rather of mitigating defeat.

Scott Ritter, a UN weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, is the author of "Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Bushwhacking of America." This article was distributed by Global Viewpoint for Tribune Media Services International.

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Marga V.

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La verdad es que es fascinante. Mucha gente, entre la cual me cuento, estaba convencida de que era principalmente el embargo quien estaba manteniendo a Saddam H. en el poder, y que sin el embargo y los bombardeos periódicos la población hubiera tenido ocasión, al menos en teoría, de quitárselo de encima.

Y ahora Ritter nos cuenta cómo todo esto ya estaba previsto por el propio Saddam, y que cuanto más se prolongue la ocupación americana, tanto más arraigará nuevamente la estructura preparada por Saddam H.

Da mucho coraje ver cómo se van preparando unos a otros las jugadas, cual partida de poker amañada por unos cuantos timadores para hacer caer a los incautos en sus telarañas.

(Marga)

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Antonio

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Ese articulo apareció el domingo en el País y creo que te confundes, Marga.
Sadam Husein cuando le vio las orejas al lobo, pues estaba cantado que tras el asedio venía la invasión, dejo de lado el baazismo laico para cogerse al islamismo patriótico que es un arma política mucho más poderosa como está quedando claro sobre el terreno.
Y lo que dice Scott Ritter, además de que la resistencia seguramente esta comandada por un místico sufí, es que cuanto más se empecinen los USAS, más formidable será el enemigo que quedará en Irak cuando no tengan más remedio que poner pies en polvorosa.
Y es que para combatir al fundamentalísimo del robo, lo mejor es el fundamentalísimo de no dejarse.

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hemp

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A continuación esto lo que dijo Scott Ritter en Noviembre 2003 sobre la resistencia iraquí..y acordar que est señor estaba durante mucho tiempo en Irak y observaba muchas cosas.. sus palabras tiene peso

Defining The Resistance In Iraq
It's Not Foreign And Its Well-Prepared


By Scott Ritter
Christian Science Monitor

11-12-3

DELMAR, N.Y. - In the Baghdad suburb of Abu Ghraib is a compound on an abandoned airstrip that once belonged to a state organization known as M-21, or the Special Operations Directorate of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. As a UN weapons inspector, I inspected this facility in June of 1996. We were looking for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While I found no evidence of WMD, I did find an organization that specialized in the construction and employment of "improvised explosive devices" - the same IEDs that are now killing Americans daily in Iraq.

When we entered the compound, three Iraqis tried to escape over a wall with documents, but they were caught and surrendered the papers. Like reams of other documents stacked inside the buildings, these papers dealt with IEDs. I held in my hands a photocopied primer on how to conduct a roadside ambush using IEDs, and others on how to construct IEDs from conventional high explosives and military munitions. The sophisticated plans - albeit with crude drawings - showed how to take out a convoy by disguising an IED and when and where to detonate it for maximum damage.

Because WMD was what we were charged with looking for, we weren't allowed to take notes on this kind of activity. But, when we returned to our cars, we carefully reconstructed everything we saw.

What I saw - and passed on to US intelligence agencies - were what might be called the blueprints of the postwar insurgency that the US now faces in Iraq. And they implied two important facts that US authorities must understand:

The tools and tactics killing Americans today in Iraq are those of the former regime, not imported from abroad.

The anti-US resistance in Iraq today is Iraqi in nature, and more broadly based and deeply rooted than acknowledged. * * * IEDs are a terrifying phenomenon to the American soldiers patrolling Iraq. The IED has transformed combat into an anonymous ambush, a nerve-racking game of highway roulette that has every American who enters a vehicle in Iraq today (whether it be the venerable, and increasingly vulnerable, Humvee, or an armored behemoth like the M-1 Abrams tank) wondering if this ride will be their last.

Far from representing the tactics of desperate foreign terrorists, IED attacks in Iraq can be traced to the very organizations most loyal to Saddam Hussein. M-21 wasn't the only unit trained in IEDs. During an inspection of the Iraqi Intelligence Service's training academy in Baghdad in April 1997, I saw classrooms for training all Iraqi covert agents in the black art of making and using IEDs. My notes recall tables piled with mockups of mines and grenades disguised in dolls, stuffed animals, and food containers - and classrooms for training in making car bombs and recruiting proxy agents for using explosives.

That same month, I inspected another facility, located near the wealthy Al Mansur district of Baghdad, that housed a combined unit of Hussein's personal security force and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The mission of this unit was to track the movement and activities of every Iraqi residing in that neighborhood straddling the highway that links the presidential palace with Saddam International Airport.

A chilling realization overcame us when we entered a gymnasium-sized room and saw that the floors were painted in a giant map of the neighborhood. The streets were lined with stacked metallic "in-box" trays - each stack represented a house or apartment building. A three-story building, for example, contained three levels of trays; each tray contained dossiers on each citizen living on that floor. Similar units existed in other neighborhoods, including those deemed "anti-regime."

Hussein's government was - and its remnants are - intimately familiar with every square inch of Baghdad: who was loyal, where they live, and who they associated with. (The same can be said about all of Iraq, for that matter, even the Kurdish and Shiite regions.) This information allows officials from the remnants of Hussein's intelligence and security services to hide undetected among a sympathetic population. Indeed, a standard quotient among counterinsurgency experts is that for every 100 active insurgents fielded, there must be 1,000 to 10,000 active supporters in the local population.

Though the Bush administration consistently characterizes the nature of the enemy in Iraq as "terrorist," and identifies the leading culprits as "foreign fighters," the notion of Al Qaeda or Al Ansar al Islam using Baghdad (or any urban area in Iraq) as an independent base of operations is far-fetched. To the extent that foreigners appear at all in Baghdad, it is likely only under the careful control of the pro-Hussein resistance, and even then, only to be used as an expendable weapon in the same way one would use a rocket-propelled grenade or IED.

The growing number, sophistication, and diversity of attacks on US forces suggests that the resistance is growing and becoming more organized - clear evidence that the US may be losing the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. To properly assess the nature of the anti-American resistance in Iraq today, one must remember that the majority of pro-regime forces, especially those military units most loyal to Hussein, as well as the entirety of the Iraqi intelligence and security forces, never surrendered. They simply melted away.

Despite upbeat statements from the Bush administration to the contrary, the reality is that the Hussein regime was not defeated in the traditional sense, and today shows signs of reforming to continue the struggle against the US-led occupiers in a way that plays to its own strengths, and exploits US weakness.

For political reasons, the Bush administration and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) haven't honestly confronted this reality for fear of admitting that they totally bungled their prewar assessments about what conditions they would face in postwar occupied Iraq.

The failure to realistically assess the anti-American resistance in Iraq means that "solutions" the US and CPA develop have minimal chance of success because they're derived from an inaccurate identification of the problem.

The firestorm of anti-US resistance in Iraq continues to expand - and risks growing out of control - because of the void of viable solutions. Unless measures are taken that recognize that the tattered Hussein regime remains a viable force, and unless actions are formulated accordingly, the conflict in Iraq risks consuming the US in a struggle in which there may be no prospect of a clear-cut victory and an increasing possibility of defeat.

Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector in Iraq (1991-1998), is author of 'Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Bushwhacking of America.'

http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1110/p09s02-coop.html

El chollo se acaba y ver que hacemos...

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Marga V.

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Caramba Hemp, me parece dinamita pura ... que Bush y cía hayan dispuesto de toda esa información ... desde hace tanto tiempo ...

¿son idiotas? ¿o a qué están jugando?

Saber que el régimen de Saddam estaba preparando a la población y en especial a las "fuerzas del orden" en justamente esas tácticas de guerrilla que ahora se están viendo, e ignorar el hecho ... de hecho creo que es público y notorio que la mayor parte de la actual administración, incluida la policial, ha sido casi literalmente heredada del anterior régimen, el de S.H. da grima ...

La verdad es que no me refería a que el actual cabecilla sea heredero de S.H. como a que el actual tinglado ya haya sido montado por éste y su equipo ... incluida la táctica de acercamiento al islamismo de mayor raigambre popular ...

vaya "merder" ...



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